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Abstract
The topic of this paper is to analyse comparatively the interest and the advan-
tages of the existence of heterogeneous institutions in the Venture Capital activity.
We focus on the duality relevant in Europe between Independent Venture Capital-
ists and the Bank-Affiliated ones. We first discuss in the second section the different
characteristics of these institutions and their comparative advantages in screening
and financing risky projects. We then develop a theoretical model which analyses
comparatively the two technologies: both IVCs and AVCs take the asymmetric risk
in seed and are backed by hedge funds equity or banks at the second round. IVCs
syndicate and AVCs use the internal ways of diversification of the bank. Screening
technologies are activated in seed and symmetric risks managed during the devel-
opment phase. We obtain analytical results conform to intuition in the analytical
part of the model and concerning the relative advantages and deficits of the two
systems. With a specified form, we analyse the coordination of their intervention
on given range of variation of the risks (and return). We find that different cases are
possible. In some circumstances, IVCs and AVCs naturally intervene on different
classes of risk but in other cases they compete on the same ones. The more as-
tonishing observation is that one may observe situations where the two institutions
choose to eliminate the projects corresponding to intermediate levels of risk and to
finance the projects with low or high levels of risk.
JEL Classification: G2, G3
Keywords: Venture capital, syndication, bank-affiliated venture capital, indepen-
dent venture capital
1 Introduction
The topic of this paper is to analyse comparatively the interest and the advantages of
heterogeneous institutions in the Venture Capital activity. We focus on the duality rel-
evant in Europe between Independent Venture Capitalists and the Bank-Affiliated ones.
∗Thanks are due to Alexandra Rufini for her help in the numerical experiments part of this paper.
†University of Nice Sophia-Antipolis - GREDEG(DEMOS) - CNRS, 250 rue Albert Einstein, 06560
Valbonne, France. E-mail: eric.nasica@gredeg.cnrs.fr, dominique.torre@gredeg.cnrs.fr
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While literature has documented this duality and discussed their respective financial
structure, ”technology” and objectives, few works have tackled the issue of the efficiency
of this heterogeneity, with the social objective to allow the development of the innovative
projects, after a selection / diversification phase where the different categories of risks
have been controlled and reduced. In Section 2, we present the different characteristics
of independent and bank-affiliated venture capitalist, as presented in the empirical and
theoretical literature. We particularly emphasized on the goals of their backers, their own
capacity to raise funds, the required level of return and risk of their investments, their
degree of involvement in the screening, monitoring and managing activities associated
to their investments. We then develop in Section 3 a theoretical model which analyses
comparatively two technologies associated namely to independent and affiliated venture
capitalists. Independent venture capitalists are baked by hedge funds and affiliated by
banks. Risky projects are financed in a two stage setting. At the first stage which is as-
similated to seed capital, independent and affiliate venture capitalists take an asymmetric
risk in seed. Independents syndicate and affiliates use the internal ways of diversification
of the bank. At this stage, screening technologies are activated. During the second stage
which corresponds to development, symmetric risks managed with the same technology.
The model is analysed in Section 4. Analytical results are conform to ideas developed
in Section 2 concerning the relative advantages and deficits of the two types of venture
capitalists regarding their activities of screening, monitoring and risk management. A
numerical analysis of a specified form of the model allows to go further in our conclusions
about the kind of investments projects (more or less risky) financed by each category of
venture capitalists. Section 5 comments and concludes.
In Section 2, we review the literature on the heterogeneity of Venture Capital. Section
3 presents the model that we analyse in section 4 analytically, then numerically after an
adapted specification. Section 5 comments and concludes.
2 Independent vs. bank-affiliated venture capital-
ists: does the source of funds influence their in-
vestment behaviour?
The strength of venture capital results from the combined provision of money, manage-
ment support, and monitoring (Sahlman 1990, Tykvova 2007). Literature frequently
considers the venture capital industry as homogenous: the standard organization of the
industry has emerged in United States, where venture capital firms are typically inde-
pendent institutions (Gompers and Lerner, 2004). These firms raise their capital for
investment from a variety of external sources that include private investors and some
financial institutions like pension and insurance companies (a common feature of inde-
pendent venture capitalist firms is that they admit no dominant investor or shareholder
in their ownership structure). Other venture capitalists differ from this prototype, with
respect to their governance as well as with regard to their objectives: corporate venture
capitalists, bank-affiliated venture capitalists, and public venture capitalists (financed
mainly with public money). Corporate and bank-affiliated venture capitalists are re-
ferred to as captive venture capitalists. A captive venture capital firm is a company that
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belongs to an established corporation investing its own resources. The parent organiza-
tion is often a financial institution, such as a bank (for bank-affiliated venture capitalists),
but can sometimes also be a larger non-financial company (for corporate venture capital-
ists). These venture capitalist funds tend to be open-ended and the amount they allocate
for investment purposes reflects the overall strategy of the parent institution.
Literature is less documented on the behaviour of bank-affiliated venture capitalists1
which is however a relevant business model in European countries. Providing empirical
evidence on different periods and countries2, Tykvova (2006), Mayer, Schoors and Yafeh
(2005), Bottazzi et al (2004), Hellmann, Lindsey and Puri (2004), or Van Osnabrugge
and Robinson (2001) have however pointed out recently that bank-affiliated venture cap-
italist firms behave differently than their independent counterparts. These differences
are related to the specific goals pursued by their respective backers but also to other
contingent ways they organize their screening and risk management activities.
2.1 Independent venture capitalist behaviour
We present in this section the investment strategies of independent venture capitalists
and the links between these strategies the goals of their backers.
Looking for high financial returns for their fund providers
Independent venture capitalists (IVCs in the rest of the paper) invest money from insti-
tutional investors whose major objective is to find high expected return on investment
(Robbie et al. 1997). Although both IVCs and bank-affiliated venture capitalists (AVCs
in the rest of the paper) are compelled to provide returns to shareholders and owner-
ship, IVCs have more pressure than AVCs from fund providers. In recent years, many
causes have contributed to an increased power of the fund providers. First, the venture
capital industry is increasingly driven by the requirements of institutional fund providers
who are under mounting pressure to achieve better than average short-term results (Van
Osnabrugge and Robinson 2001). Second, fund providers are now also being advised by
organizations known as “gatekeepers”, who determine which venture capitalists should
be supplied (Robbie et al. 1997). Finally, it can be argued that IVCs need to demon-
strate high (above-average) returns on their investments to please the exclusively financial
goal of their fund providers. To reach this goal, IVCs have to choose specific investment
strategies.
Specializing on certain investment types
According to literature, specialization is a crucial issue in the ‘technology’ of IVCs. Re-
cent empirical works focusing on the European venture capital market (Tykvova, 2006,
Bottazzi et al. 2004, Schertler 2005) pointed out that IVCs concentrate on early-stage
financing. The risk of failure decreases with firms’ development (Ruhnka and Young
1991). Firms in early stage might have less collateral because they often invest in in-
tangible assets (Goel and Hassan 2004). Moreover, evaluating the risks and returns of
1For an analysis of corporate VCs, see for instance Gompers and Lerner (2000) and Hellmann (2002).
2In Europe banks are the third largest fundraising source (14% of the total European funds raised),
behind pension funds (27%) and funds of funds (18%), Source: EVCA Yearbook 2007.
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early-stage investments is more difficult than evaluating the risks and returns of later-
stage investments.
Gupta and Sapienza (1992), Manigart (1994), and De Clercq and Dimov (2003) found
that venture capitalists who specialise in a particular stage of investment, e.g. early phase,
and/or in a sector of industry, acquire a better expertise and thereby achieve a compet-
itive advantage deriving from the accumulation of “hard to imitate” internal resources.
According to Gupta and Sapienza (1992), a limited industry (or development stage) scope
of investments facilitates control over the management of the financed companies by the
venture capitalist firm: it is difficult for portfolio companies to hide issues of manage-
ment incompetence or other crucial information regarding company performance to the
venture capitalist firms more in-depth understanding of the industry (or development
stage). Another reason why investments in similar types of portfolio companies may
pay off is the increased possibility that subsequent investments lead to learning curve
effects through the application of superior knowledge (e.g. Gupta and Sapienza 1992,
De Clercq, Goulet, Kumpulainen and Ma¨kela¨ 2001). For instance, the ability to grasp
the management problems related to a certain stage of development, or to understand
the competitive specifics in a particular industry, may increase (e.g. Wright and Robbie
1998).
Similar ideas are developed by Sahlman (1990) who observes that specialization can
reduce marginal operating costs when VCs learn and develop skills over time. By spe-
cializing, the VCs can accumulate area-specific experience in a fast and efficient fashion.
They can establish long-term relationships with suppliers, customers, lawyers, and in-
vestment bankers. This network of contacts cultivates a flow of profitable deals for VC
firms. The ultimate effect is that the marginal cost of selecting and supervising a port-
folio company declines over time, and the VC firm becomes more productive. Gompers
and Lerner (2004) also indicate that VCs have highly specialized skills. These skills are
very difficult to develop. It would be costly and time-consuming for VCs to switch to
new product or business areas.
IVCs and syndication
With regard to deal selection and monitoring, VCs have developed different strategies
to reduce uncertainty in their high risk environment. Among these strategies, staging of
venture capital is a common way to react to an uncertain environment (Gompers and
Lerner 1999). Moreover in recent years VC companies have been striving to syndicate
investments with other venture capitalists (Manigart et al. 2002, Wright and Robbie
1998). An equity syndicate involves two or more VC firms taking an equity stake in
an investment for a joint payoff (Wilson 1968), either in the same investment round or,
more broadly defined, at different points in time (Brander, Amit and Antweiler 2002).
Syndicates are typically formed by a lead investor who contacts other potential investors
or partners and records their commitments to invest.
According to Schertler (2005), banks less often syndicate their investments than other
kind of fund providers. For their part, Manigart et al. (2002) or Sevenson and Stuart
(2002) found that the more a VC firm is specialised in terms of industry sector, the
higher its propensity to syndicate in general. Given what has been said above about
the “specialization” of venture capital firms and the difficulties in refinancing under the
growing pressure exerted by institutional investors, it is likely that IVCs tend to syndicate
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more their investments than AVCs.
Why do VCs give up potential return by not investing the whole amount needed by
the portfolio company, but rather look for another VC firm to coinvest and thereby share
in the potential gains (or losses)? This question is compounded by the fact that syndicate
arrangements are subject to agency conflicts and, hence, agency costs (Fried and Hisrich
1995, Wright and Lockett 2003). What are the perceived benefits that compensate for the
costs involved in syndication? For an independent IVC, which, as noted above, is often
very specialized, an obvious answer is risk diversification. Indeed, through syndication,
each IVC firm can invest in a large scope of projects and thereby diversify its portfolio
and reduce firm-specific risks (Gompers and Lerner 2004, De Clercq and Dimov, 2003,
Hege et al. 2003). By spreading investments across a greater number of investments that
do not covary, syndication has the potential to reduce risk. A fully diversified portfolio
is, however, more difficult to obtain for VC firms compared with institutional investors
who invest in listed stock because of the capital constraints due to the relatively small
size of a VC firm or fund (Sahlman 1990, Wright and Robbie 1998). If the VC firm is too
small relative to the project size, syndicating the deal may be the only way to invest in
that particular deal without unbalancing the VC portfolio. Moreover, syndication gives
the VC firm the opportunity to invest in a larger number of portfolio companies than it
could do without syndication, thereby increasing diversification and reducing the overall
risk of the fund.
Yet, the literature on VC syndication discusses several other motives as to why VC
firms syndicate their deals. They may also encourage independent VCs to syndicate their
investments. These motives are recalled below.
(i) Information sharing: Individual VCs tend to have investment expertise that is both
sector-specific and location-specific where syndication helps diffuse information across
sector boundaries and expands the spatial radius of exchange (e.g. Sorenson and Stuart
2001).
(ii) Improved screening: Involvement of another VC firm provides a second opinion
(e.g. Lerner 1994, Gompers and Lerner 2004, Hege et al. 2003). In this “resource-based
approach” the venture capital market is seen as a pool of productive resources in which
a VC organisation can access resources of another venture capitalist through syndication
(Manigart et al. 2002, Bygrave 1987). The evaluation of the same venture proposal by
different VC companies operating in a syndicate reduces therefore the potential danger
of adverse selection (Lerner 1994). The combined effort to assess the quality of a venture
helps VC investors to overcome informational asymmetries as the entrepreneurs typically
know more about the investment opportunity they seek funding for and might overstate
the attractiveness of his business proposal (Sorenson and Stuart 2001).
(iii) Deal flow: Syndication may be a means to reduce the uncertainty with regard to
good economic opportunities for investing in the future. By syndicating a deal, VC firms
expect other partner VC firms to reciprocate the gesture in the future (Lockett and Wright
2001, Lerner and Schoar 2004), thereby securing improved access to more and/or better
quality deals (Seppa¨ and Ja¨a¨skela¨inen 2002, Sorenson and Stuart 2001). Moreover, the
expectation of reciprocity reduces the incentives to behave opportunistically and hence,
trust between syndicating partners may be enhanced (Wright and Lockett 2003).
(iv) Portfolio value add: Syndication networks may help VCs to add value to their
portfolio companies, (Hellman and Puri 2002, Lindsey 2003). The benefit of involving co-
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investors is derived from heterogeneous skills and information different venture capitalists
can contribute to the management of the venture company. The need for such additional
resources is expected to be greater in earlier stages of an investment, than in later-stage
investments. This is mainly due to the fact that more mature invested-companies already
have an established management structure and market position and have already built
relationships with suppliers and customers (Lockett and Wright 1999, Brander et al.
2002).
(v) Image: Certification and reputation gains when syndicating with more experienced
VCs (e.g. Hsu 2004). At exit, and more specifically at IPO, syndication may lead to
enhanced certification and lower underpricing of the portfolio company (Chowdry and
Nanda 1996, Stuart, Hoang and Hybels 1999).
(vi) “Window dressing”: VC firms may syndicate investments even if the financial
returns to such investments are relatively low in order to show potential investors an exit
record (VC firms benefit from the investee’s popularity and use it for their own marketing
purposes) (Lerner 1994, De Clercq and Dimov 2003).
2.2 The “strategic” behaviour of bank-affiliated venture capi-
talists
AVCs behaviours also depend on the goals pursued by their fund providers. But these
goals sensibly differ from the goals of their independent counterpart. There are two main
characteristics in the relation linking AVCs and their fund providers. First, AVCs have
’unlimited’ access to finance (Woolfman 1993) and, thus, may have a greater tolerance
for lower returns, providing that other goals are being met (Robbie et al. 1997). Second,
contrarily to independent VCs, the main goal of the fund providers, i.e. banks, is not
essentially a financial objective but a component of a more general strategy.
Indeed, for AVCs, venture capital investment activity can be seen as an extension
of the services provided to a potentially profitable market segment and as a mechanism
for binding clients into the financial investor (Bruno 1986). For example, Hellmann
(2002) builds up a model suggesting that strategic venture investors - like commercial and
investment banks - try to select firms bringing complementarities to their core activities
of lending and underwriting. Hellman, Lindsey and Puri (2004) empirically investigate
this claim, finding that banking organizations use their venture capital subsidiary to
build relationships which are in the long run beneficial for their lending activities. They
find a strong relationship between banks providing venture investments and companies
subsequently raising loans. Furthermore, they show that having a prior venture capital
relationship significantly increases a bank’s chance of participating in a company’s loan
deal.
To sum up, banks “strategically” engage in VC financing with the aim to build re-
lationships for their core lending activities. This result is important: it implies that
potential profits resulting from complementarities to core financial segments may reduce
the incentive for banks to actively govern their venture capital clients (Hellmann, Lindsey
and Puri 2004). Given that banks have a strategic focus, they have little incentive to
expand costly resources on building value added support capabilities. If, as underlined
above, banks use venture capital mainly to build lending relationships, building the in-
frastructure for providing value-adding support may not be their main priority. In other
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words, it may not be necessary to fully imitate the independent venture capitalist for
banks to achieve complementarities between their venture capital and lending activities.
This “relationship hypothesis” may explain why AVCs tend to be less intensively involved
in the management and monitoring of their portfolio companies than IVC firms. Rather
they focus on later-stage investments, where value-adding support is relatively less critical
(Bottazzi et al. 2004, Tykvova 2006, Hellmann, Lindsey and Puri 2004).
3 The model
The following model deals with the economic challenges of the heterogeneity of VCs and
the coexistence of IVCs and AVCs. Is there some interest to maintain this diversity?
In which case do they specialise or not in some classes of risk? Is there competition or
complementarities of IVCs and AVCS on the projects to be financed? In which case it
could be interesting to develop one form or the other to increase the performance of risk
capital activity?
We then suppose that IVCs and AVCs are faced to risky projects to be financed.
We begin the presentation of the model by the description of these projects. Then we
present the “technologies” available to each kind of venture capitalists and their decision
to finance or not a project.
3.1 Projects and Risks
We present here the start-up and projects to be financed and the categories of risk
associated to them.
Start-ups and projects
Each start-up project must be financed during 2 periods before the success or failure of
the project can be observed and the survivors introduced to the market, sold to larger
firms or submitted to other exit procedures. The first period corresponds to the seed
stage (time 1) and the second to the development stage (time 2). No start-up can reach
the development stage without having been previously funded during the seed stage by
a venture capitalist (IVC or AVC).
Symmetric risk
Each start-up project is characterized by its expected return, its level of asymmetric risk
and its level of symmetric risk. Symmetric risk is linked to nature (i.e. to the evolution of
the unpredictable components of demand or to other factor influencing the environment
of the start-ups); this kind of risk is supposed the same for all projects. As symmetric
risks related to the different start-ups are not correlated, they can be managed or reduced
by adequate diversification.
Asymmetric risk
Asymmetric risk is associated with the technological components of each project and with
the organizational and managerial features of the start-up associated with the develop-
ment of the project. These components are not observable at time 0 but only - more or
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less perfectly - after the VCs have devoted time and effort to advising and monitoring
tasks related to the financed project. Greater is the expected return E (Rj) of a class
j project, higher is the probability of failure due to asymmetric risk p0j = f [E (Rj)] of
this project estimated at time 0, i.e. f ′(·) > 0 and limE (Rj)→+∞f(·) = 1. We suppose
also that the probability of failure/return pairs are also consistent with a risk-aversion
assumption, i.e. that f ′′(·) < 0. At last, if Rf represents the free of risk rate of return,
we have by definition f(Rf ) = 0.
3.2 IVCs and AVCs
There are two kinds of Venture Capitalists (VCs), Independent Venture Capitalists (IVCs)
and Affiliated ones (AVCs). AVCs are backed to commercial banks while IVCs are not.
AVCs are more generalist whereas each IVC has a specific expertise in one of the k sectors
of activities.
Each AVC can finance at more one project.
IVCs are gathered in syndicates of k members, each member being specialized in one
different sector. When a syndicate finances a project in sector h, the IVC expert in
sector h activities plays the role of leader inside the syndicate and the other members
are partners. There is in this way an hierarchical complementarity between the effort
of the leader which plays the role of a fundamental input and the effort of the partners:
the asymmetric uncertainty of the project cannot be reduced without any leader but the
partnership improves the quality of the revealed information and the screening efficiency.
Each IVC can finance one project as leader of its syndicate and participates to k − 1
projects as a partner in the same syndicate. For the sake of simplicity, we suppose that
the leadership and partnership technologies can be defined independently of the sector of
activity and that there is strict symmetry among the different kind of partnerships: this
assumption introduces also a strict symmetry between all IVCs interventions.
Each project requires a capital contribution S in seed at time 0 and a second capital
contribution D in development at time 1. The contributions in seed are provided by the
VCs from their own reserves and advances. VCs use the probability of failure as the
relevant variable to evaluate the risk and weight the cost according to the level of risk of
the project. IVCs are funded by their shareholders (hedge funds or other risky funds. . . )
at the development stage of each maintained project. At the same stage, AVCs are funded
by their partners banks. Banks rise fixed rate middle term loans on the money market
to finance the development stage of the selected projects. AVCs pay to the banks a risk
premium for their internal diversification of risks.
IVCs and asymmetric risk
The reduction of asymmetric risk is obtained by the application of effort levels provided
by VCs during time 1 (seed period) by the leader and its partners. The effect of these
efforts is to reduce asymmetry and to provide to the VCs an early diagnosis of the
future failures. These observations result in liquidating some start-ups at time 1 instead
of waiting that the failure of the related projects can be definitively observed at time
2. Let p1j(e
l
j, e
−l
j ) represent the probability at time 0 that a project of class j could be
liquidated at time 1, as a result of the monitoring activity of a syndicate corresponding to
an effort elj of the leader and e
−l
j of each partner. The following conditions then capture
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the hierarchical complementarity between elj and e
−l
j : (i) ∀elj > 0, δp1j(·)/δelj > 0 and
δp1j(·)/δe−lj > 0, (ii) ∀e−lj , p1j [0, e−lj ] = 0 and (iii) ∀elj > 0, p1j [elj, e−lj ] > 0. Condition (i)
involves that, whatever the level of effort of the members of a given syndicate, the leader
and the partners of this syndicate are always able to improve the information on the
quality of the project; condition (ii) specifies that with no effort of the leader, there is no
possible improvement of information for the syndicate about the quality of the projects;
condition (iii) points out that the probability of reaching an early liquidation cannot be
higher than the probability of failure of the considered project due to asymmetric risk
(efforts are not useful to manage symmetric risk).
When an IVC chooses to participate at a syndicate, it then allocates its global effort
limited to unity between an effort elj as leader in one of the projects managed by the
syndicate and consolidated efforts (k − 1)e−lj as partners in the other projects of the
syndicate, i.e., ∀(elj, e−lj ), elj + (k − 1)e−lj ≤ 1 . This effort has a cost that we suppose
linear, i.e., c[elj+(k−1)e−lj ] = c1elj+c2(k − 1)e−lj where c1 and c2 are positive parameters.
The expected return of the project net from the expense S supported during the seed
stage form the net return of the project submitted to uncertainty. As a consequence,
these terms integrate the effect of risk aversion of VCs. This effect depends on the level
of initial risk since the effort of IVCs to disclose the bad projects is not able to reduce
initial expenses. We choose the simple form gIV C(p0j) = 1− p0j(2− p0j).
IVCs, AVCs and symmetric risk
If necessary, the reduction of symmetric risk is reached by diversification. In the case
of AVCs, this diversification is made at the development stage by the bank backing the
venture capitalist. The bank is refunded on the monetary market at a free of risk rate of
interest r and then must use internal ways of diversification / management of the risk.
The risk premium paid to the bank by the AVC depends on the performance of the di-
versification schemas of the bank but also from the initial efficiency of the selection made
by the AVC during the seed stage. Better is this selection, smaller will the proportion
of wrong projects submitted to diversification measures. We then suppose that diver-
sification generates among AVCs and the banks who back them, the payment of a risk
premium P (p0 − p1) increasing with the number of bad project still financed during the
development stage, i.e. such that dP (·)/d(p0j − p1j) > 0. During the development stage,
IVCs are refunded by hedge funds at a risky rate of interest rh, (rh > r) . This situation
does not require diversifying3.
The organisation of IVCs syndicates and IVCs expected utility
This model is not devoted to analyse the coordination of IVCs inside syndicates but only
the consequences of syndication. We then introduce two reasonable assumptions about
the interactions inside syndicate.
A1: There is no free-riding inside syndicates.
3We take this risky rate of interest as given. This assumption is probably a bad assumption in long
period: hedge funds can choose to invest or not in the capital of an IVC according the expected return
of those IVCS. Financial arbitrage then determine the rate rh which probably finally depends at least
on the probability of failure of the IVC, i.e. on the investment choices of IVCs. We neglect these effects
on this “short term” version of the model
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A2: The members of the same syndicate choose symmetric actions (i.e. all the projects
managed in a given syndicate all belong to the same class of risk) and are equally remu-
nerated.
With A1 and A2, syndicates can be represented as cooperative entities where the level
of effort of each participant inside a given syndicate is the result of the maximisation of
the joint expected utilities.
If an IVC chooses to participate (i.e. to finance one start-up project or to participate
to one syndicate financing a bundle of projects), its expected utility is defined as its
expected discounted profit minus its discounted deterministic costs (of effort and financial
in the development stage), minus the expected utility of its seed financing loss. All IVC
participating to a syndicate in charge of projects of class j then maximise in (elj, e
−l
j ) the
following expression:
uIV Cj (e
l
j, e
−l
j ) = −[SgIV C(p0j) + c(elj + ke−lj )]
−Drh[1− plj(elj, e−1j , k)]ρ−2 + E(Rj)gIV C(p0j)ρ−2
(1)
The first term of the right component of (1) is related to the costs in seed, the second
to the financial costs in development and the third the expected gross return.
AVCs expected utility
When an AVC chooses to finance a project of class j, it chooses the level of effort fj able
to maximise its expected utility given by:
uAV Cj (fj) = −[SgAV C(p0j) + c(fj)]
−DP [p0j − p1j(fj)]ρ−1
−Dr[1− plj(fj)]ρ−2 + E(Rj)gAV C(p0j)ρ−2
(2)
The first term of the right component of (2) is related to the seed costs, the second
to the risk premium paid by the AVC to the bank before the development stage as an
insurance against the possibility of failure of the project during the development stage,
the third to financial costs paid to the bank at the development stage, the fourth term
to the expected gross return. risk aversion has the same consequence than for IVCs on
the evaluation of the expected net return of the projects.
Individual choices and financed projects
We will suppose that all the available projects and their corresponding classes of risk are
observed by the VCs. IVCs and AVCs then determine and rank the classes of risks their
are able to finance. These classes can or not overlap and, in case of overlaps, the ranking
orders can or not correspond. If the classes do not overlap, the financed start-ups are
those the classes of which are the top ranked ones by IVCs or AVCs. When there is
an overlap between the choices of IVCs syndicates and AVCs, the form of the matching
process has an influence on the number and the nature of the financed projects. In the
case of a random matching process, the projects belonging to the classes concerned by the
overlap are attributed randomly to the AVCs and IVCs syndicates, in the limit of their
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capacity. Otherwise, if one category is served first, this category chooses inside or outside
the range of overlap the projects that it will fund according its own ranking and then
ends up its choices. The second category is then served, within the remaining available
projects...
In the following section, we will not specify the nature of the matching process. We
will then limit to consider the distribution of AVCs and IVCs choices and the possible
overlaps between these choices.
4 The results
We first present general results on the general form of the model, then introduce a spec-
ification that we analyse with the help of numerical examples.
4.1 General Results
If we consider that uIV Cj = 0 and u
AV C
j = 0 are the reservation utilities for IVCs and
AVCs, a given project j is acceptable and able to be ranked by IVCs (resp. AVCs) if
uIV Cj (e
l
j∗, e−lj ∗) > 0 (resp. uAV Cj (fj∗) > 0), where (elj∗, e−lj ∗) (resp. fj∗) represent the
solutions of (1) (resp. the solution of (2)).
We are then able to prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Whatever the expected return (respectively the risk of failure ) of the
class j project, there exist optimal actions of IVCs and AVCs.
Proof : Since (elj, e
−l
j ) and fj are defined on compact and convex subsets ((0, 0) ≤
(elj, e
−l
j ) ≤ (1, 1 − elj), 0 ≤ fj ≤ 1), only discontinuities of uIV Cj (elj, e−lj ) > 0 and
uAV Cj (fj∗) > 0 could prevent the existence of this optimum. Let consider the prop-
erties of (1) and (2). Given continuity of c(elj + ke
−l
j ) and p
1
j(e
l
j, e
−l
j ) on arguments, (1)
is continuous on (elj, e
−l
j ) in the compact {(0, 1) × (0, 1)} , of which the set of definition
of the variables is itself a compact subset. Equation (1) has then always at least one
optimum (elj∗, e−lj ∗). When (elj∗, e−lj ∗) is such that uIV Cj (elj∗, e−lj ∗) < 0, this optimum is
implicitly substituted by the inaction pair (0, 0), demonstrating the proposition for IVCs.
The same demonstration holds for the choices of AVCs when the consequences of the con-
tinuity of P (p0j−p1j(fj)) and equation (2) are considered inside the compact 0 ≤ fj ≤ 1.
The answer to the more interesting questions, i.e. the range of the projects financed
by each kind of VCs and the level of risk of the projects finally financed depends (i) on
the properties of functions uIV Cj (e
l
j, e
−l
j ) and u
AV C
j (fj), and (ii) on the form of the relation
between the expected return and the risk of the available projects.
Obviously, the form of the function f(·) providing the relation between the probability
of failure of the projects and their expected gross return is essential, since this relation
describes implicitly the efficiency frontier. Another important point is the distribution of
the projects according their expected return and the existence (or not) of an upper limit
to this distribution. It is not reasonable to consider that this distribution is uniform.
When the expected rate return increases, the frequency of efficient projects decreases. It
is not inconvenient to consider that there exist an upper bound to the projects expected
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rate of returns and to analyse the consequence of the level of this boundary on the choices
of the financed projects. Greater is the effect of the risk on the expected utility of the
VCs, smaller is the range of the financed projects. Otherwise, higher is the ability of the
VCs to screen the projects during the seed stage, larger will be the range of the projects
able to be funded.
The following results then fall from comparison of the IVCs and AVCs financial tech-
nologies:
Proposition 2. All things equal, the following circumstances provide an advantage to
the IVCs versus the AVCs:
(i) the efficiency of syndicates on the early screening phase of the projects
(ii) the efficiency of syndicates in diversifying the risk of the projects
(iii) the heterogeneity of competences (or the specialisation) of the syndicated IVCs
Proof : (i) All things equal and for given values of elj, e
l
j and k, an increased efficiency of
syndicates at the seed stage has a positive influence on the screening process and, for a
given p0j , increases the value of p
1
j(e
l
j, e
l
j, k) in the expression (1). If (e
l
j∗, elj∗) is such that
(elj∗ 6= 0) and (e−lj ∗ 6= 0), this improvement increases p1j(elj∗, elj∗, k), then the optimal
value of (1). If elj∗ = 0, then an increased efficiency of the screening function of the
syndicates does not decreases (1) and may increase it. (ii) All things equal, an increased
efficiency of syndicates in the diversification of risks decreases gIV C(p0j), then increases
directly uIV Cj (e
l
j, e
l
j), whatever the considered pair (e
l
j, e
l
j) inside the definition set. (iii)
The heterogeneity of competences has the double advantage of increasing p1j(e
l
j, e
l
j, k) and
decreasing gIV C(p0j) whatever the pair (e
l
j, e
l
j) considered inside the set of definition of
variables. 
Proposition 3. All things equal, the following circumstances provide an advantage to
the AVCs versus the AVCs:
(i) low rate of interest on monetary markets
(ii) the efficiency of the diversification of development risks by these banks
(iii) the expertise of the AVC
Proof : (i) Low rates of interest on monetary markets decrease the costs of financing of
the banks, then increases the third term of expression (2). (ii) the efficiency of the diver-
sification of risks of banks decreases the risk premium dP (·)/d(p0j − p1j) for a given value
of (p0j − p1j), then increases the second term of (2). (iii) All increase of the expertise of
the AVCs increases (p1j) and decreases (p
0
j − p1j) for a given p0j . This effect is positive on
Dr[1− plj(fj)] and on P [p0j − p1j(fj)], then on (2). 
Propositions 2 and 3 confirm the observations already made by earlier empirical works,
but do not go further. Namely, they do not provide an extended comparison between the
two systems for the more interesting questions which still remain opened. For instance,
they are not able to answer the following questions: (i) what kind of investments can
be efficiently financed by each category of VCs, (ii) do IVCs and AVCs compete on the
same classes of risk or do they provide complementary devices to increase the efficiency
of the financial system as a whole? In order to explore these points, we introduce an
adapted specification of the model, able to tolerate the use of numerical examples and
experiments and propose in this paper some first exploratory numerical examples.
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4.2 An exploratory numerical analysis of a specified form of the
model
We have specified the components of the model in order to explore comparatively under
Mathematica the sets of relevance of the intervention of IVCs and AVCs and the related
efficiency issues of venture capital partnerships taken as a whole. We have chosen the
same relation p0j = f [E(Rj)] = tanh[0.25E(Rj)− 0.25] between the probability of failure
and the expected utility of the available projects, in the IVC and AVC versions. The cost
of effort has been chosen quadratic in the two cases and expressed as c(elj + ke
−l
j )
2 and
c(fj)
2 respectively for IVCs and AVCs where c is a positive constant. The specification of
expression (1) integrates the effect of the performances of syndicates. We have selected
p1j(e
l
j + ke
−l
j ) = p
0
j [e
l
j(2 − e1j) + γke−lj (2 − e−lj )] where γ is a positive constant. For the
specification of the individual expertise of the AVCs in (2), we have chosen symmetrically
p1j(fj) = p
0
jfj(2− fj). For the effect of the probability of failure at time 2 on the risk pre-
mium paid by the AVCs to the banks, we have chosen P [p0j − p1j(fj)] = α+ β[p0j − p1j(fj)]
with α, β > 0
Figure 1a: AVCs expected return and
utility
Figure 1a: IVCs expected return and
utility
Figure 1: the benchmark case
We have considered different values for the sensible parameters of the model and a
large range of variation of all the components of equations (1) and (2). We begin with
a benchmark that we choose for values of the parameters identifying for each class of
risk the expected utility of AVCs and IVCs. On the axis of abscissas, we note the level
of expected return of the projects (and implicitly their levels of risk) and on the axis
of ordinates the level of expected utilities of the VCS. The set of the positive values of
expected utility correspond to the set of accepted return (and risk) of the projects. The
sensible parameters are Rf the free of risk return, E(Rj) the upper considered limit of the
expected rate of return of the risky projects, S and D the respective levels of investment
in seed and in development, α the β the parameters conditioning positively the extra
financial cost of the symmetric and the remaining asymmetric risks for the AVCs during
the development phase, k the number of IVCs in each syndicate, γ the weight of each
partner compared to the weight of the leader in a syndicate for a given project, c the
parameter weighting the cost of the screening effort, rh the rate of return required by the
hedge funds, r the rate of interest of the free of asymmetric risk bank loans to the AVCs,
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ρ the term of actualization.
For the benchmark, we have chosen the following values of the parameters: Rf = 10,
E(Rj) = 100, S = 3, D = 12, α = 0, β = 0.15, k = 6, γ = 0.4, c = 0.5, r
h = 0.3, r = 0.1,
ρ = 1.05.
As one can see in Figures 1a and 1b, the projects associated with a low level of ex-
pected return (less than 15) are not financed by AVCs and IVCs. The same is true for
the projects associated with a hight expected return (larger to 75) and risk. For the
medium levels of return and risk, the profile of excepted utilities are both asymmetric
with a maximum observed between 25 and 30.
Figure 2a: IVCs expected return and
utility
Figure 2b: AVCs expected return and
utility
Figure 2: An increase of the cost of (symmetric and asymmetric) risk
Figure 2a corresponds to the initial values of the parameters except the rate of return
of the hedge funds that we have supposed raising to rh = 0.5. As intuition predicts,
the upper return (and risk) limit of the acceptable projects of IVCs decreases together
with the maximum value of their utility function. More generally, any increase of the
spread of quality has the consequence of providing an advantage to AVCs over IVCs with
reciprocity. An increase of the financial cost of the symmetric risk to α = 0.2 and of
the asymmetric one to β = 0.8 (figure 2b) has the same consequence on the profile of
expected utilities of AVCs. Shortly, an increase of the cost associated to the remaining
risk during the development period limits the range of intervention of both categories of
VCs. Here, the increase of the effort of monitoring which is also observed in both cases
does not reach to compensate the effect of the financial cost of the remaining risk at the
development stage.
With an increase of the cost of effort of monitoring to c = 4, the range of acceptance
of the projects reduces again as in figure 3a for AVCs. With the same changes and after
increasing the rate of return of the hedge funds to rh = 0.6, we observe that the range of
intervention of IVCs decreases less for the high classes of risk (figure 3b). This observation
does not depend on the values of the parameters that we have chosen: it suggests that
syndication techniques may generate an advantage for IVCs for the high risk projects
when selection of the good projects is not easy.
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Figure 3a: AVCs expected return and
utility
Figure 3b: IVCs expected return and
utility
Figure 3: An increase of the costs of monitoring
The last observation that we present in this exploratory paper is associated to the
following values Rf = 10, E(Rj) = 100, S = 9, D = 18, α = 0, β = 0.4, k = 6, γ = 0.15,
c = 1, rh = 0.6, r = 0.1, ρ = 1.05. From the benchmark conditions, we have mainly
changed the levels of investment in development and in seed. We have also supposed
that the cost of monitoring is slightly higher than it was for the benchmark. We have
assumed at least that the sensibility of the extra financial cost associated to the remaining
asymmetric risk during the development stage has increased for both the category of VCs.
The profiles of expected utilities of AVCs and IVCs are respectively presented in figures
7 and 8.
Figure 4a: AVCs expected return and
utility
Figure 4b: IVCs expected return and
utility
Figure 4: An increase of the level of financial investment and of the cost of risk at the
development stage
One observes that the conjunction of an increase of financial costs on the risk remain-
ing during the development stage and of the level of investment in seed cuts the utility
associated to each class of risk for both AVCs and IVCs. This shift of the two curves
of utilities is however not symmetric and one observes that AVCs offers more resistance
than the IVCs to this change of the initial conditions. The explanation is that with a
high return of the hedge funds and a quite high sanction of asymmetric risk for both
categories of VCs but with a small role of expertise compared to effort during the seed
stage and a low cost of the diversification of symmetric risk inside the bank(α = 0), the
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AVCs have an advantage on the IVCs for quite all classes of risk.
5 Comments and conclusions
This paper analyses comparatively the performances and advantages of two forms of
organisation of the venture capital financing. We have chosen to concentrate on the
Independent Venture Capitalists and the Bank-Affiliated Venture Capitalists. We first
discuss in the second section the different characteristics of these institutions and their
comparative advantages in screening and financing risky projects. We then develop a
theoretical model which analyses comparatively two technologies: both IVCs and AVCs
take the asymmetric risk in seed and are backed by hedge funds equity or banks at the
second round. IVCs syndicate and AVCs use the internal ways of diversification of the
bank. Screening technologies are activated in seed and symmetric risks managed during
the development phase. We obtain analytical results conform to intuition in the analytical
part of the model and concerning the relative advantages and deficits of the two systems.
With a specified form, we analyse comparatively their intervention for the different levels
of risk and return of the projects. We find that AVCs and IVCs present different ways to
manage the limitations generated by financial costs. All increase of the capacity of the
banks to manage symmetric risk create an advantage for the AVCs. All increase of the
spread of quality has the same effect. This advantage can however be only apparent if
the bank charges additional interest penalties, associated to the asymmetric uncertainty
remaining during the development stage, and, overall, pegs these penalties on the rate
of return of the hedge funds. The syndication effects can generate appropriate effects of
selection when the cost of monitoring increases. The effect is nor symmetric for all classes
of risk and creates an advantage for the IVCs over the AVCs on the high classes of risk.
AVCs resist however better than IVCs when the weight of expertise decreases or when
the weight of investment increases during the two phases of seed and development. These
observations suggest extending our model to a hybrid case where some of the features of
the two institutions would compose the technology of hypothetical semi-AVCs. In a more
developed version of the paper, we also plan to analyse with more details the influence of
the matching process of VCs (IVCs and AVCs) and projects on the efficiency of the VC
sector.
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